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1 Introduction
The fuzzy core was introduced by Aubin (1979) as the set of allocations of a pure exchange
economy that are robust to blockings by all fuzzy coalitions. To interpret a fuzzy coalition,
one thinks of an economy as being comprised of several types of agents, with each type
being represented by a continuum of identical individuals. The fuzzy coalition then specifies
the number (the mass) of the participants of each type.
The fuzzy core is known to be non–empty under very general conditions. In partic-
ular, Florenzano (2003) establishes the non–emptiness of the fuzzy core in an infinite–
dimensional production economy (see Proposition 5.2.3, page 115).
This note provides a new proof of the non–emptiness of the fuzzy core. The proof
is based on the concept of the (Π, β)–balanced core for games without side payments,
a special case of the so–called core with additional requirements introduced recently in
Bonnisseau and Iehle´ (2003). A given economy gives rise to a non–transferable utility
game whose (Π, β)–balanced core corresponds, in a natural way, to the ²–fuzzy core of
the original economy. The non–emptiness of the fuzzy core can therefore be deduced from
the non–emptiness result for the (Π, β)–balanced core provided in Bonnisseau and Iehle´
(2003).
Our non–emptiness result is weaker than that provided by Proposition 5.2.3 in Floren-
zano (2003). The result in Florenzano (2003) applies to an economy with a non–trivial
production sector, while our construction is limited to pure exchange economies. Fur-
thermore, to transform the problem of the non–emptiness of the fuzzy core into that of
the non–emptiness of the (Π, β)–balanced core, we have to rely on the existence of the
utility functions. This is in contrast to the result in Florenzano (2003), where the con-
sumer preferences may lack completeness or transitivity. On the other hand, we are able
to maintain quite general assumptions with respect to the commodity space of an econ-
omy. As in Florenzano (2003), the commodity space in this paper is a general (possibly
infinite–dimensional) linear Hausdorff topological space.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 some notation is introduced.
In Section 3 the fuzzy core and the ²–fuzzy core are defined. In Section 4 some preliminary
results are presented, including the non–emptiness result for the (Π, β)–balanced core. In
Section 5 the non–emptiness of the ²–fuzzy core is demonstrated.
2 Notation
Let n be a positive integer. Then N is the set of integers {1, . . . , n}, andN is the collection
of non–empty subsets of the set N . Rn is the space of functions x : i ∈ N 7→ xi ∈ R.
RN is the space of functions λ : S ∈ N 7→ λS ∈ R. Given S ∈ N , define the set
∆S = {piS ∈ Rn |piiS = 0 for all i ∈ N\S,
∑
i∈S pi
i
S = 1}. Given an ² ∈ (0, 1/n), let
∆²S = {piS ∈ ∆S |piiS ≥ ² for all i ∈ S}. Let β denote the barycenter of ∆N . For a subset
A of Rn, the symbols intA, ∂A, and coA denote, respectively, the interior, the boundary,
and the convex hull of A.
2
3 Fuzzy core
We consider a pure exchange economy E in which the set of agents isN , and the commodity
space is C. Each agent i ∈ N is characterized by a consumption set X i ⊆ C, initial
endowment of commodities ei ∈ C, and a utility function ui : X i → R. Given S ∈ N we
write XS to denote the product ×
i∈S
X i.
We employ the following assumptions:
(A1) The commodity space C is a linear (over the field of real numbers) Hausdorff topo-
logical space.
(A2) For each i ∈ N , the set X i is a closed convex set containing ei, and the set F (E ) ={
x ∈ XN |
∑
i∈N x
i =
∑
i∈N e
i
}
of feasible commodity allocations is a compact set.
(A3) For each i ∈ N the utility function ui is a continuous and quasi–concave function.
Definition 1 An allocation x ∈ F (E ) is an element of the fuzzy core Cf (E ) of the economy
E if there exist no pi ∈ ∆N and no χ ∈ XN such that
∑
i∈N pi
iχi =
∑
i∈N pi
iei and
ui(χi) > ui(xi) for all i ∈ N with pii > 0.
It is instrumental to consider the following modification of the fuzzy core, called the ²–fuzzy
core. In the ²–fuzzy core it is required that for any fuzzy coalition pi with support S the
mass pii of the participants of each type i ∈ S be at least ² > 0.
Definition 2 An allocation x ∈ F (E ) is an element of the ²–fuzzy core Cf² (E ) of the
economy E if there exist no S ⊆ N , no pi ∈ ∆²S and no χ ∈ XS such that
∑
i∈S pi
iχi =∑
i∈S pi
iei and ui(χi) > ui(xi) for all i ∈ S.
Theorem 1 For each ² ∈ (0, 1/n), the ²–fuzzy core of the economy E is non–empty.
The proof of Theorem 1 is given Section 5. Our main result is the following.
Theorem 2 The fuzzy core of the economy E is non–empty.
Proof. To prove Theorem 2 we consider fuzzy core as a limit of the ²–fuzzy core as ²
approaches zero. Observe that Cf² (E ) ⊆ Cf²′(E ) whenever 0 < ² ≤ ²′. Moreover, the fuzzy
core of the economy E can be written as
Cf (E ) =
⋂
²∈(0,1/n)
Cf² (E ).
Since the non–emptiness of the ²–fuzzy core follows from Theorem 1, it suffices to demon-
strate that Cf² (E ) is a compact set. We show that it is a closed subset of F (E ).
Let x be a point of F (E ) not in Cf² (E ). Then there exist S ⊆ N , pi ∈ ∆²S and χ ∈ XS
as in Definition 2. For a fixed χ, the inequalities ui(χi) > ui(xi), i ∈ S, define an open
neighborhood of x in F (E ) contained entirely in the complement of Cf² (E ). Thus, the
complement of Cf² (E ) in F (E ) is an open set, as desired.
3
4 (Π, β)–Balanced core
An n–person game with non-transferable utility (hereafter referred to simply as a game)
is a family of sets V = 〈V (S)〉S∈N satisfying the following assumptions. For all S ∈ N
(G1) V (S) is a non–empty closed subset of Rn.
(G2) [v ∈ V (S), v¯ ∈ Rn, v¯i ≤ vi for all i ∈ S] implies [v¯ ∈ V (S)].
(G3) There is a number M such that vi ≤M for all i ∈ S and v ∈ V (S).
The core of the game V is a set of Rn given by
C(V ) = V (N)
∖ ⋃
S∈N
intV (S).
Given v ∈ Rn, let S(v) = {S ∈ N | v ∈ ∂V (S)}.
The (Π, β)–balanced core is a special case of the so–called core with additional require-
ments for games with non-transferable utility introduced in Bonnisseau and Iehle´ (2003).
The (Π, β)–balanced core generalizes the idea of the socially stable core for socially struc-
tured games in Herings et al (2003).
Definition 3 Let V be a game. For each S ∈ N let ΠS : ∂V (S) → ∆S be a cor-
respondence with non–empty convex values and with a closed graph. Then the (Π, β)–
balanced core of the game V is the set of points v in the core of V such that β ∈
co {ΠS(v) | S ∈ S(v)} .
Thus the (Π, β)–balanced core is a selection from the core. If the correspondence ΠN is
constant and maps each v into the one–point set {β}, then the (Π, β)–balanced core of V
coincides with the core of V .
The (Π, β)–balancedness condition for games without side payments belongs to the
class of payoff–dependent balancedness conditions studied in Bonnisseau and Iehle´ (2003).
A related reference is Predtetchinski and Herings (2003), where the payoff–dependent bal-
ancedness was shown to be a necessary and sufficient condition for the non–emptiness of
the core.
Definition 4 Let V be a game. For each S ∈ N let ΠS : ∂V (S) → ∆S be a correspon-
dence with non–empty convex values and with a closed graph. The game V is said to be
(Π, β)–balanced provided that the following condition is satisfied: if v ∈ Rn is such that
β ∈ co {ΠS(v) | S ∈ S(v)}, then v ∈ V (N).
For the proof of Theorem 3 the reader is referred to Bonnisseau and Iehle´ (2003).
Theorem 3 Let V be a game. For each S ∈ N let ΠS : ∂V (S)→ ∆S be a correspondence
with non–empty convex values and with a closed graph. Suppose that the game V is (Π, β)–
balanced. Then the (Π, β)–balanced core of the game V is non–empty.
4
5 The non–emptiness of the ²–fuzzy core
Let an ² ∈ (0, 1/n) and an economy E be given. We construct a non–transferable utility
game V ² and the correspondences ΠS in such a way that the (Π, β)–balanced core of the
game V ² corresponds, in a natural way, to the ²–fuzzy core of the economy E . In the game
V ², the utility tuple v is considered feasible for a coalition S if it is feasible for some fuzzy
coalition piS with support S in the original eocnomy E . Given the vector of utilities v in
∂V ²(S), we let ΠS(v) to consist of those fuzzy coalitions piS that can achieve the utility
of v. We then show that the the game V ² is (Π, β)–balanced and that its (Π, β)–balanced
core corresponds, under the utility functions, to the ²–fuzzy core of the economy E .
Given S ∈ N , let
Z²(S) =
{
(xS, piS) ∈ XS ×∆²S
∣∣∑
i∈S
piiSx
i
S =
∑
i∈S
piiSe
i
}
(1)
V ²(S) =
{
v ∈ Rn
∣∣∣∣∣ there exists (xS, piS) ∈ Z²(S) such thatui(xiS) ≥ vi for all i ∈ S
}
. (2)
Proposition 1 For each ² ∈ (0, 1/n), Z²(S) is a non–empty and compact set.
Proof. For each ² ∈ (0, 1/n), the set ∆²S is non–empty, and Z²(S) contains a non–empty
subset {eS} × ∆²S, where eiS = ei for all i ∈ S. Define FS(E ) to be the set of feasible
commodity allocations of the coalition S:
FS(E ) =
{
xS ∈ XS
∣∣∣∑
i∈S
xiS =
∑
i∈S
ei
}
.
First we argue that FS(E ) is a compact set. The set FN(E ) is compact by assumption
(A2). For a a proper subset S of N the set FS(E ) can be considered a subset of FN(E )
given by
FN(E )
⋂{
x ∈ X | xi = ei for all i ∈ N\S} .
By assumption (A2), C is a Hausdorff space, so a one–point set {ei} is closed in X i for
each i. It follows that FS(E ) is closed in FN(E ); therefore, it is a compact set.
To see that Z²(S) is a compact set, let |S| be the cardinality of S; let C|S| be the
|S|–fold product of C, and let ϕ be a continuous function from the space C|S| × ∆²S to
itself that carries a point (xS, piS) to a point (x˜S, piS), where
x˜iS =
1
piiS
xiS +
(
1− 1
piiS
)
ei
for each i ∈ S. Then
Z²(S) = (XS ×∆²S)
⋂
ϕ(FS(E )×∆²S).
The product of the compact sets FS(E ) and ∆²S is a compact set, and so is its image under
ϕ. Thus Z²(S) is a closed subset of a compact set; therefore, it is a compact set.
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Proposition 2 For each ² ∈ (0, 1/n), the family of sets V ² = 〈V ²(S)〉S∈N satisfies condi-
tions (G1)–(G3).
Proof. Condition (G2) is satisfied by definition of V ²(S). To verify conditions (G1) and
(G3), let us write the set V ²(S) as
V ²(S) =
{
v ∈ Rn
∣∣∣∣∣ there exists v˙ ∈ V˙ ²(S) such thatv˙i ≥ vi for all i ∈ S
}
,
where V˙ ²(S) is defined by
V˙ ²(S) =
{
v ∈ RS
∣∣∣∣∣ there exists (xS, piS) ∈ Z²(S) such thatui(xiS) = vi for all i ∈ S
}
.
The set V˙ ²(S) is the image of the set Z²(S) under the composition of the maps
XS ×∆²S XS RS.................................... ....................................
where the first map is the natural projection, and the second map is a Cartesian product
of the functions ui for i ∈ S. It follows that V˙ ²(S) is a non–empty compact subset of RS;
in particular, it is bounded from above. From this one can easily see that the set V ²(S)
satisfies conditions (G1) and (G3).
We remark that for ² = 0 the family of sets V ² may fail to meet conditions (G1) and (G3),
since Z0(N) is not, generally, a compact set. It is to avoid this difficulty that the ²–fuzzy
cores and the corresponding games V ² were introduced.
Define the correspondences ΠS : ∂V
²(S)→ ∆²S as follows. Given v ∈ ∂V ²(S) let
ΠS(v) =
piS ∈ ∆²S
∣∣∣∣∣
There exists xS ∈ XS such that∑
i∈S pi
i
Sx
i
S =
∑
i∈S pi
i
Se
i
ui(xiS) ≥ vi for all i ∈ S
 . (3)
Proposition 3 For each v ∈ ∂V ²(S) the set ΠS(v) is non–empty and convex. The corre-
spondence ΠS has a closed graph.
Proof. The set ΠS(v) is non–empty by definition of V
²(S). To prove that it is a convex
set, let piS, pi
′
S ∈ ΠS(v) and t ∈ [0, 1] be given. We must show that piS = tpiS + (1 − t)pi′S
is an element ΠS(v). Let xS, x
′
S be points in XS such that
∑
i∈S pi
i
Sx
i
S =
∑
i∈S pi
i
Se
i and
ui(xiS) ≥ vi for all i ∈ S, and similarly for x′S. Given i ∈ S let x˜iS be defined as
x˜iS =
1
piiS
[tpiiSx
i
S + (1− t)pi′iSx′iS]
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By convexity of the consumption sets one has x˜iS ∈ X i. By quasi–concavity of the utility
function, ui(x˜iS) ≥ vi for all i ∈ S. Finally,∑
i∈S
piiSx˜
i
S = t
∑
i∈S
piiSx
i
S + (1− t)
∑
i∈S
pi′iSx
′i
S
= t
∑
i∈S
piiSe
i + (1− t)
∑
i∈S
pi′iSe
i
=
∑
i∈S
piiSe
i.
Thus, piS ∈ ΠS(v), as desired.
To see that the graph G of the correspondence ΠS is closed, let us write it as the set
G =
{
(v, piS) ∈ ∂V ²(S)×∆²S
∣∣∣∣∣ there exists (v˙, piS) ∈ G˙such that v˙i ≥ vi for all i ∈ S
}
,
where G˙ is defined by
G˙ =
(v, piS) ∈ RS ×∆²S
∣∣∣∣∣
there exists xS ∈ XS such that
(xS, piS) ∈ Z²(S)
ui(xiS) = v
i for all i ∈ S
 .
Then the set G˙ is the image of Z²(S) under the continuous map XS × ∆²S → RS × ∆²S,
which is a Cartesian product of the utility functions ui for i ∈ S and the identity map on
∆²S. It follows from Proposition 1 that G˙ is a compact set. From this one can easily see
that the set G is closed in ∂V ²(S)×∆²S.
Theorem 4 Let the game V ² and the correspondences ΠS : ∂V
²(S) → ∆²S be defined by
Equations 1–3. Let an allocation x be an element of the ²–fuzzy core of the economy E .
Then the utility tuple v is an element of the (Π, β)–balanced core of the game V ², where
vi = ui(xi) for all i ∈ N . Conversely, let the utility tuple v be an element of the (Π, β)–
balanced core of the game V ². Then there exists a commodity allocation x in the ²–fuzzy
core of the economy E such that vi ≥ ui(xi) for all i ∈ N .
Proof. Let the commodity allocation x be in the ²–fuzzy core of the economy E . Let
v ∈ Rn be given by vi = ui(xi) for all i ∈ N . It is clear that v is in the core of the game V ².
Since we have the inclusion β ∈ ΠN(v), the vector of utilities v is in the (Π, β)–balanced
core of V ².
Conversely, let the vector of utilities v be in the (Π, β)–balanced core of the game V ².
Then for each S ∈ S(v), there exists a vector piS ∈ ΠS(v) and a non–negative number λS
such that
β =
∑
S∈S(v)
λSpiS.
7
This can be rewritten componentwise as
1 =
∑
S∈S(v)
nλSpi
i
S for all i ∈ N.
It follows from the definition of the game V ² (Equations 1 and 2) that for every S ∈ S(v)
there exists a commodity allocation xS ∈ XS such that∑
i∈S
piiSx
i
S =
∑
i∈S
piiSe
i
ui(xiS) ≥ vi for all i ∈ S.
Define the commodity allocation x¯N ∈ XN as follows. For each i ∈ N let
x¯iN =
∑
S∈S(v)
S3i
nλSpi
i
Sx
i
S.
The consumption vector x¯iN is a weighted average of the vectors x
i
S over those coalitions
S ∈ S(v) that contain player i. By convexity of the consumption sets, x¯iN is an element of
X i. By quasi–concavity of the utility functions,
ui(x¯iN) ≥ vi for all i ∈ N.
Moreover, ∑
i∈N
[x¯iN − ei] =
∑
i∈N
∑
S∈S(v)
S3i
nλSpi
i
S[x
i
S − ei]
=
∑
S∈S(v)
nλS
∑
i∈S
piiS[x
i
S − ei] = 0.
We see that the allocation x¯N is an element of the set F (E ). Since v is not an interior point
of any set V ²(S), the allocation x¯N is robust to deviations by fuzzy coalitions piS ∈ ∆²S for
all S ∈ N . Thus, x¯N is in the ²–fuzzy core of the economy E .
Theorem 5 The game V ² is (Π, β)–balanced.
We omit the proof of this theorem as it is similar to the proof of Theorem 4. Theorem 5
implies that the (Π, β)–balanced core of the game V ² is non–empty. Our argument is now
complete.
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